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 This paper explores the reintegration challenges Serbian refugees 
face as they attempt to return to local Croatian communities. It pro-
vides a comparison between the modes of cooperation, levels of trust 
and social networks that existed before the war in the 1990s with 
those that have developed upon their return. Furthermore, this paper 
explores the returnees’ perceptions of public institutions, and more 
specifically their incentives for return and integration.  
 Reintegration cannot be understood as a singular process that re-
sults in one absolute returnee experience. Rather, this study will ana-
lyse reintegration as a set of complex processes, decisions and per-
ceptions resulting from varying conditions and experiences. In order 
to successfully evaluate these experiences, this paper will focus on 
‘practical categories’, and how they gain or lose meaning in public 
and private environments. Utilizing this approach, this paper will ar-
gue that the setting to which a Serbian refugee returned affected his 
or her experience, producing both feelings of inclusion and exclusion. 
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Introduction 
 The 1990s were among the most turbulent times in the history of south-
eastern Europe. The dissolution of former Yugoslavia resulted in the separa-
tion of the previously federated republics into sovereign states. In most 
cases, however, violent conflicts ensued. Nationalist ideologies, the key 
catalyst of the emerging wars, advocated for the alignment of national bor-
ders and ethnically homogeneous nations. The enveloping conflicts created 
hundreds of thousands of forced migrants, whose ethnic membership made 
them victim to nationalist opportunism.  
 Croatia witnessed two major flows of forced migration. In 1991, a large 
number of ethnic Croats were displaced from territories occupied by Serbian 
separatists. In 1995, the military Operations “Flash” and “Storm,” which re-
sulted in Croatia re-seizing its territory, drove more than 200,000 Serbs from 
their homes. In the following years, the national government was slow to 
implement legislation to facilitate their return. It was not until 1998, follow-
ing the introduction of the Program for Return, that significant, but still very 
low numbers of Serbian refugees began to return. Local Croatian communi-
ties, however, were often a very unfriendly environment. A number of social 
and institutional obstacles prevented Serbs from having an easy reintegra-
tion. This paper will focus on the experiences and perspectives of the Ser-
bian refugees who decided to return. 
 The study seeks to explore the complexity of the refugees’ return experi-
ences, including the economic hardships associated with post-conflict socie-
ties, the negative public images of their roles in the conflict, hostility at the 
social level, and the institutional practices of a discriminatory state. A key 
part of the analysis will examine how returnees expressed their agency in 
such contexts, and the reintegration outcomes associated within them. 
 Reintegration cannot be understood as a singular process that results in 
one absolute returnee experience. Rather, this study will analyse reintegra-
tion as a set of complex processes, decisions and perceptions resulting from 
varying conditions and experiences. In order to successfully evaluate these 
experiences, this paper will focus on ‘practical categories’ (Brubaker 1996: 
65-66; Brubaker 2006: 11-12), and how they gain or lose meaning in public 
and private environments. Using this approach, this paper will argue that the 
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setting to which a Serbian refugee returned affected his or her experience, 
producing both feelings of inclusion and exclusion. 
 Data collected from the town of Glina during December 2006 and Janu-
ary 2007 will support this argument. The major findings of this research are 
that the perceived degrees of re-integration for the Serbian returnees to Glina 
vary depending on 1) the institutional contexts within which they act and 2) 
their specific demographic variables such as age and occupation. Encounters 
with institutional actors, including state officials and bureaucrats, led many 
Serbian returnees to perceive high levels of alienation and low degrees of 
integration into Croatian society. Yet in everyday and non-formal settings, 
reintegration experiences differ across the returnee population, depending on 
the particular demographic features and category memberships of a commu-
nity. These disparities reveal that reintegration is complex process, largely 
dependent on a returnee’s perceived freedom of agency associated with dif-
ferent social contexts.  
 This argument will be developed in four sections. The first part will ana-
lyse returnee and reintegration literature and suggest questions for a future 
analysis of Serbian returnees. In this section, Brubaker’s analytical frame-
work for studying ethnicity and nationality will be adapted to the experi-
ences of Serbian returnees. The second section will provide information on 
the historical, contextual and political issues surrounding Serbian returnees 
in Croatia in order to help understand the conditions of return faced by Ser-
bian returnees. The third and fourth sections will examine the results and 
analysis of the data provided from the aforementioned town of Glina.  
 
1. Returnees and return: does the experience of returnees 
matter?  
 Geopolitical changes in the post-Cold War era have produced a discourse 
in which repatriation is most often considered the most desirable solution of 
the refugee problem. Recently, however, this notion has been challenged by 
scholars of forced migration. Many experts now question the refugee’s de-
sire to return (Harrell-Bond 1989), the latent interests hidden in repatriation 
policies and legislative language (Chimni 1993; Chimni 1999), whether re-
turn amounts to the end of the refugee experience (Black and Koser 1999; 
Chimni 2002, Hammond 1999). Yet the pertinent issue most often neglected 
is what reintegration means to returnees.  
 According to Chimni (1999), the history of desirable solutions toward the 
refugee problem can be divided in two periods. Until the mid-1980s, reset-
tlement was considered the key objective. Later, however, refugee discourse 
became dominated by the promotion of various types of repatriation (volun-
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tary, safe and imposed). Chimni argues that it is often unclear who benefits 
the most from these so-called desirable solutions. In most cases, these poli-
cies were enacted in the interests of host states, rather than the refugees 
whose improved conditions were the supposed aim (1999: 10).  
 The explanation for the above-mentioned policies can be found in the 
discourse which, inter alia, Malkki calls the “pathologization of uprooted-
ness in the national order of things” (1992: 33). According to this under-
standing, nations and cultures are considered to be naturally connected to a 
particular territory, consequently ‘rooting’ individuals and their identities in 
particular places (1992: 26). Malkki notes that biological terms, which are 
strongly associated with this approach, provide powerful images of normal-
ity connecting an identity and a territory of origin (1992: 26). This allows 
states the ability to continue repatriation policies by claiming that, ‘for many 
refugees the strongest hope is to return home,’ (GCIP 2002: 247), as well as 
present their policies as the natural order in a world in which national and 
cultural boundaries are understood to follow clearly demarcated lines and 
definable territories (Malkki 1992 :27). 
 Finally, one can argue that, in addition to these policies that promote 
resettlement, particular historical events in the 1990s led to the perception 
that a return home is ‘desirable.’ First, as Black and Gent argue, the reasons 
for a growing interest in repatriation must be seen in light of the post-Cold 
War ‘peace dividend’ (2004: 5), which made plausible the idea that refugees 
could return home. As well, many of the wars in the 1990s were followed by 
a violent period of ethnic cleansing in pursuit of political goals. By promot-
ing repatriation, the international community sought to mitigate ethnic clean-
sing, and to right the wrong by encouraging or forcing minority refugee 
populations to return to their areas of origin (Phoung, 2000).  
 Yet what happens to refugees after their return has not been adequately 
covered in major academic or policy debates (Hammond 1999; Chimni 
2002; Black and Gent 2004; Kibreab 2002; Black and Koser 1999). The ex-
periences of refugees upon their return must be seriously considered as re-
settlement is not necessarily, as policy makers simplistically assume, “the 
logical end of the refugee cycle” (Koser and Black 1999: 5). Rather, the idea 
of return raises a number of obstacles and challenging tasks, including ad-
aptation, development, and change regarding new or unfamiliar conditions 
(Zetter 1988: 101). As Zetter notes, the absence of root causes of refugee 
flow is not a sufficient determinant for which to judge a sustainable return 
(1988: 100). Hammond (1999) further argues that, in many cases, return is 
nothing like a traditional homecoming for refugees. The social, economic, 
and political conditions that existed before the return rarely resemble those 
encountered by refugees upon their return. Return is rarely a reintegration 
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into old ways of living, but instead the beginning of a new chapter of adap-
tation to a set of completely new circumstances (1999: 229).  
 The social contexts in which returnees find themselves may be either 
very formal and institutionalized, or informal. Zetter’s (1991) classic article 
on labelling reveals the power of bureaucracy to form, transform and politi-
cise identities of refugees dependent on the provisions associated with a la-
bel (1991: 40). More analysis is needed, however, to show the extent to 
which such labelled identities influence a returnee population’s methods in 
dealing with everyday situations. This may be especially important in cases 
where the refugee flux is an outcome of nation-state formation (Arendt 
1985; Zolberg 1983). As Zolberg (1983) noted, these processes were not the 
outcomes of rational economic goals or calculations of the nation-states. On 
the contrary, emerging states were readily prepared to sacrifice their eco-
nomic interest for mere political and ideological goals, driving out portions 
of their population even though it might be against their economic interests 
(Zolberg 1983: 33). This is particularly relevant to those states that emerged 
in the late twentieth-century.  
 In such cases, the ideology of ethnic homogeneity does not always result 
in ethnic cleansing and peace treaties. Instead, many emerging nation-states 
simply perpetuate discriminatory policies and practices towards a particular 
group of ethnic returnees long after the conflict has ended (Phoung 2000: 
171-172). It remains to be seen whether the exclusion and limitation of par-
ticular categories of returnees from public settings will be reproduced in pri-
vate settings, where the former refugees encounter their pre-war neighbours 
and attempt to (re)-establish cooperation and contact with them. The existing 
literature provides competing answers to this question. These theories gener-
ally depend on the causes of the refugee flux in a particular case study. 
 Kibreab’s study identifies positive cooperation outcomes between those 
who stayed and returnees (2002). He concluded that Eritrean returnees were 
usually welcomed warmly by those who had stayed behind. In fact, returnees 
were often perceived as the triggers of development, bringing skills and 
trans-national social networks back to their communities (2002: 61-69). In 
this case, however, the variable responsible for mediating between those 
who stayed and returnees was a belief that both groups exercised resistance 
against a common external enemy, ultimately creating the opportunity for an 
independent state (2002: 59-60). Nevertheless, the situation for returnees is 
rarely so favourable in multi-ethnic societies where war played a part in state 
formation. Rather, as Blitz argues, “Returnees may be associated with previ-
ous regimes and attached to former ethnic and political elite structures, and 
thus be the subject of hostility and jealousy” (2006: 242).  
 The case of Serbian returnees to Glina proves to be useful in accessing 
the impacts of the above-mentioned reintegration challenges, strategies, and 
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policies. As it will be shown, the environment of Glina for Serbian returnees 
posed two primary impediments for their reintegration. On the state and 
public level, a number of discriminatory policies were implemented to im-
pede returnee’s reintegration into Croatian society. On the societal level, re-
turnees were often met with animosity. This hostile environment often pre-
vented returnee’s from establishing their former private lives. The results 
from Glina contribute to the argument of scholars like Hammond (1999), 
who emphasize the importance of refugees’ agency and their capabilities in 
assessing the situation and adjusting their actions accordingly (239). Glina 
also substantiates the arguments of scholars who highlight the importance of 
bureaucratic practices and the refugee’s subsequent dependency on such in-
stitutionally formed labels (Zetter). Faced with ethnic animosity and exclu-
sion at the social-level and discriminatory practices at the state-level, Ser-
bian returnees developed various modes of communication with their fellow 
townsmen and made adjustments to their new living conditions, resulting in 
different reintegration outcomes over the course of time. 
 In order to appropriately assess the Serbian returnee’s reintegration to 
Glina, one must keep in mind that nationality and ethnicity often remained 
central to the basic environmental conditions, as well as the political lan-
guage of elites long after a conflict ended. If the nationality or ethnicity of 
refugees were associated with the ‘other’ sides in the conflict, the manner in 
which they are presented in the political sphere in a post-conflict environ-
ment usually poses a problem for successful reintegration. 
 The foremost scholars on nationalism, such as Gellner, Smith and Ander-
son, provide valuable analytical frameworks for identifying the causal rela-
tions between historical processes (Gellner 2006, Anderson 1983), myths 
and symbols (Smith 1986) and ways of developing a sense of belonging to a 
community (Anderson 1983). Yet for the analysis proposed in this research, 
it is necessary to examine ethnicity and nationality in an everyday context, in 
order to analyse its relevance to the reintegration experience of a particular 
ethnic minority in Croatia. 
 Brubaker’s approach provides an adequate framework for this task 
(1996; 2004; 2006). He opposes the ‘taken for granted “groupist” construc-
tivist paradigm’ in the study of nationalism and ethnicity (2006: 7). A 
groupist approach, although it emphasizes that nation and ethnicity are con-
structed phenomena, assumes that ethnic groups are the main social actors 
(2006: 8). This results in using groups as units of analysis, easily attributing 
their identity, agency and will to pre-constructed notions and “neglects the 
everyday contexts in which ethnicity and national categories take on mean-
ing and the processes through which ethnicity actually “works” in everyday 
life” (2006: 9). Rather, he argues for an alternative approach, introducing a 
 
Politička misao, Vol. XLV, (2008.), No. 5, pp. 191–217 197 
                                                                                                                            
distinction between ‘categories’ and ‘groups’ as its central device (1996; 
2004; 2006).  
 Brubaker defines groups as “mutually interacting, recognizing collectiv-
ises with a sense of solidarity, corporate identity and capacity of concerted 
action” (2006: 11), while maintaining these categories as a potential basis for 
group formation, or what he refers to as ‘groupness’ (2006: 9). The approach 
treats ethnicity and nationality as practical categories. This allows for an ex-
ploration of the processes and ways in which people use them in everyday 
settings to create their meanings of social context, and adjust their actions 
accordingly. Therefore, nationalism and ethnicity can be perceived as inter-
pretative frames that help us make sense of social reality. Brubaker, how-
ever, acknowledges that these are not the only such frames:  
Ethnicized ways of experiencing and interpreting the social world can 
only be studied alongside a range of alternative, non-ethnicized ways 
of seeing and being (2006: 15). 
 An analysis viewing ethnicity and nationality as categories, and which 
treats ‘groupness’ across these categories as something that happens (rather 
than exists) in various social settings, we can better understand the realities 
and meanings of reintegration from the perspective of the refugee. This al-
lows us to consider how other practical categories shape these realities and 
guides the feelings and actions of returnees. This approach also allows us to 
study the declining curves of “groupness” across the category in situations 
where social settings give greater significance to other practical categories 
(Brubaker 2004: 19). These insights can be applied to the case of Serbian 
returnees in Croatia in order to evaluate and analyse the different reintegra-
tion outcomes within the particular locality.  
 
2. Political background on the Serbian returnees to Croatia 
 After the five year period of Serbian occupation of Croatian territory, and 
the break down of several negotiations to peacefully resolve the conflict, 
Croatian armed forces began Operation Flash in May 1995. Flash’s success 
resulted in Croatia’s reclaiming UN Sector West (Western Slavonia). This 
was followed by Operation Storm in August, which secured UN Sectors 
North and South (Banija and Krajina). During and after Operation Storm, 
approximately 250,000 Serbs left Croatia and sought refuge in bordering 
countries, mainly Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia, due to gross human 
rights violations against the Serbian population in the territories reclaimed 
by the Croatian military and police forces (HHO 2001: 20). Croatian offi-
cials did invite Serbs to stay in their homes and welcome the Croatian army, 
but the situation in the field largely negated this as a viable option. The 
number of Serb refugees soon climbed to an estimated 300,000 (OSCE 
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2005), and over the last decade the return of Serbian refugees has become 
one of the most controversial issues in Croatian politics. 
 The war in Croatia raised several issues regarding the nature of the strug-
gle, which must be taken into account in order to understand the social con-
text Serbs faced at the time of their return. A number of scholars have even 
suggested that the outcomes, policies and actions of politicians before, dur-
ing and after the war, raise legitimate concerns that ethnic cleansing was not 
just the outcome of war, but instead its intended aim (Žunec 1998; Banac 
2006). 
 During the war, Žunec argues (1998: 111) that the rational logic of war 
to reach a particular goal was often replaced by an irrational desire to de-
stroy targets. The purpose of such fighting was to create powerful symbols1 
that have potential long-term ideological effects on local communities. 
Similarly, Banac (2006) argues that ethnic cleansing and the idea of national 
homogenization should be considered as the real aims of the Balkan wars. 
As such, they developed from an idea shared equally by all parties in the 
conflict: that stability of the state is possible only if the statehood is consti-
tuted in the polity without national minorities (Banac 2006: 30). 
 According to Županov (1995) the main characteristic of local communi-
ties in the former Yugoslavia was the intentionally developed networks of 
primary social relationships between members of different ethnic groups 
(1995: 36). These networks existed in the institution of the “neighbourhood,” 
present throughout Yugoslav history. Violence was never perceived to come 
from within the community, but as something imposed from outside. In such 
situations neighbours would protect each other by providing shelter or help 
in escape (1995: 36). The destruction of these practices was the cornerstone 
of nationalist politics. As Žunec argues (1999), the primary aim of the war 
was the destruction of infrastructure and primary social relations, in order to 
make any future cooperation impossible. The war in the Balkans destroyed 
these primary networks and the trust associated with them, because in this 
war “it is the neighbour who kills, plunders and dislodges his neighbour” 
(Županov 1995: 39). 
 During the immediate aftermath of Operations Flash and Storm, the 
Croatian media perpetuated negative images of Serbs as anti-Croatian state 
elements, with whom it will never be again possible to share lives (IHO 
1998: 39). It is important to note that these messages were not delivered by 
 
1 In his study on inter-ethnic relations in the town of Vukovar, Kardov (2002) represents a 
symbolic significance of this town. In academic and popular literature, Vukovar is presented as 
a “symbol of suffering,” a “symbol of victory”, a “Town Hero,” etc. (Kardov 2002: 99-100). 
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the marginal actors of Croatian political space, but from the highest political 
authorities.2  
 In addition to the media, the population’s memories of the recent atroci-
ties committed against Croats created a hostile environment for the return of 
Serbian refugees at the community-level. The Croatian government also 
contributed to the animosity. During the 1990s, a number of policies and 
legislation were enacted that created greater obstacles for the return of Ser-
bian refugees. Human Rights Watch designated these practices as ‘Bureau-
cratic Ethnic Cleansing’ (1996: 29). These policies were particularly relevant 
to issues of citizenship, housing, reconstruction and constitutional rights.3  
 Institutional policies improved following the 2000 elections, when a new 
centre-left government was elected. The newly elected president, Stjepan 
Mesić, and Prime Minister Ivica Račan stated that return and reintegration 
was a key priority of the new government. The social and economic aspects 
of return were later detailed in the ‘Knin Conclusion’ (US State Department 
2002; Blitz 2005: 369). Legislation was soon thereafter enacted to provide 
equal minority representation in political bodies and education in minority 
languages. As well, the Housing Action Plan on repossession 2001-2002 was 
soon adopted into law (HRW 2003: 4, OSCE 2004).  
 Three years later, the right-wing HDZ party replaced the centre-left 
coalition; Ivo Sanader became the new Prime Minister. The government sur-
 
2 Croatian President Franjo Tudjman made particularly infamous statements in which he 
openly expressed his relief that the Serbs left Croatia: “Even the Croatian President openly says 
that Croatia’s future was not safe, while they [the Serbs] were living in Knin. Tudjman did not 
hide his relief at the fact that the Serbs had left Krajina, stressing that his appeal to the Serbian 
population during the Storm military operation was made only for the world’s sake. He com-
pared Serbs to cancer destroying the Croatian national being at the very heart of Croatia and 
concluded that there is no return to the past” (IHO 1998: 39). 
3 Probably the most appropriate illustration of such discriminatory practices could be found 
in housing legislation. The Law on Temporary Take Over and Administration of Certain Prop-
erty (LTTO) enacted in 1995, and The Law on Areas of Special State Concern (LASSC), 1996, 
established a framework within which the Croatian government could legally seize the property 
of Serbian refugees in Croatia. The rationale behind these laws was to protect abandoned prop-
erty, but in practice expropriated the Serbs from ownership of their homes. According to LTTO, 
owners had a right to reclaim their property within 90 days, and if this right was not exercised 
the special law was to regulate the ownership questions (HRW 1996: 31). However, because of 
difficult procedures and security obstacles to return, many Serbs could not practice this right. 
Their property was later allocated mostly to Croatian refugees from Bosnia, Croatian IDPs and 
Croats from Vojvodina (HRW 1999:16). Similar impediments were enacted regarding the own-
ership on tenancy rights. (HRW 1999; Blitz 2005: 368). Detailed information on other legisla-
tion producing impediments to return can be found in the following sources: on the legislation 
on citizenship in Croatia in 1991 (HRW 1996; 1999; Blitz 2003); on impact of the Reconstruc-
tion Act (HRW 1999: 38-41), on the temporary suspension of The Constitutional Law on Hu-
man Rights and Freedoms and The Rights of National Minorities (Petričušić 2004; HRW 1996). 
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prised the public by forming a coalition with representatives of Serbian mi-
norities in parliament. Following the country’s admission to begin member-
ship negotiations with the EU, Croatia established full cooperation with 
ICTY and continued to progress on returnee issues, although at a slow pace 
(European Commission 2006).These positive changes were followed by the 
trilateral Sarajevo agreement between Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and 
FRY in 2005, obliging its signatories to solve their refugee issues by the end 
of 2006 (OSCE 2006b).  
 The policies enacted during the 1990s dramatically illustrate the demo-
graphic picture of Croatia. Before the war Serbs amounted to 12.5% of 
Croatia’s population, but at the time of the last census this figure had fallen 
to 4.54% (DZS 2001). Improvements in policies came too late for many 
refugees, and from the estimated 300,000 Serbian refugees who left Croatia 
during the 1990s (OSCE 2005), only 123,642 have returned (MMTPR 
2006). 
 These figures raise a series of questions regarding Serbian reintegration 
experiences in Croatia. What were the prospects of reintegration in such an 
environment? Are there possibilities for the restoration of trust between 
Serbs and Croats after the return, and in what circumstances do returnees 
cling to ethnic category to shape their perceptions of reintegration? Finally, 
what effects did the legislative policies have on the perceptions of Serbian 
returnees regarding their ability to reintegrate and “belong” to Croatian soci-
ety? How (if at all) did these perceptions change in 2000 with the election of 
a new government? 
 
3. Serbian returnees in Glina 
3.1. Methodology 
 The data presented in this article was collected while conducting research 
in Zagreb and Glina in December 2006 and January 2007. It consists of five 
group and fourteen individual interviews. Twenty-seven individuals in total 
were interviewed. All interviews were semi-structured with open-ended 
questions; this allowed for a “qualitative description of the life world of the 
subject with respect to interpretation of their meaning” (Kvale 1996: 124). 
While most interviews were taped, several individuals requested the recorder 
to be turned off. Thus, four interviews were documented via handwritten 
notes. All taped interviews were transcribed. NGO representatives, local and 
national politicians and Serbian and Croatian returnees were all recognised 
as relevant actors for this research.  
 Interviews with officials and NGO representatives were conducted in or-
der to document the relevant background information on current return poli-
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cies and administrative obstacles. Interviews with Serbian returnees were 
conducted in order to gain insight into their perceptions of return and reinte-
gration. Interviews were also conducted with Serbian residents of Glina who 
chose to stay during the war. Their insight was useful in gaining their per-
spective of the returnees. Serbian returnees were contacted via the Serbian 
Democratic Forum (SDF) office in Zagreb. An SDF employee in Glina pro-
vided me with contacts of various educational backgrounds, occupations, sex 
and age.  
 Croats in Glina were contacted via the recommendations of interviewed 
Serbian returnees and through contacts established with the local municipal-
ity. Yet, where four interviews were arranged via the latter channel, only two 
actually took place. Although we can only speculate on the reasons for the 
two cancelations, it is important to note that their decision was made after 
they received information regarding the main focus of the study.  
 The interview process itself raised several practical and ethical chal-
lenges. Due to the sensitivity of the topic, interviews were organized in a 
comfortable environment which would encourage interviewees to talk 
openly about their experiences (Michell 1999: 36). In most cases, interviews 
took place at the interviewee’s homes. Two were conducted at their work 
place and one at a local café. 
 In order to establish rapport, I engaged an informal discussion with the 
contacts prior to asking their permission to record the conversation. This al-
lowed participants to ask questions about the research itself, and decode the 
researcher’s interest in Serbian returnees. Informal conversations usually 
lasted from one to two hours. At their conclusion, I asked participants if they 
would be willing to participate in a more formal interview. The taped ses-
sions lasted between fifty minutes and two hours. The questions were open-
ended, which allowed interviewees to focus on themes of their choosing. 
When a topic or theme in one conversation appeared for the first time it 
would be added to a list of topics to be addressed with the next participant. 
 One of the main concerns of this style of analysis relates to the presenta-
tion of the data in order to capture the difficulties, challenges and realities of 
return experiences as a whole. All recorded interviews were transcribed, and 
together with the notes from non-recorded interviews, data was coded by 
identifying the leading themes and grouping them according to the chrono-
logical order of their appearance. Following Brubaker’s framework, I no-
ticed that some practical categories had been replaced by others, while other 
categories grew or diminished in significance over the course of time. There-
fore, I decided to present data in chronological order regarding important pe-
riods through which returnees’ present experiences have been shaped. All 
interviewees were classified as anonymous in order to assure their confiden-
tiality.  
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3.1. Approaching Glina 
 Glina’s Official website provides a comparison of the ethnic structure be-
fore and after the war. In 1991, 23,040 people lived in the area; 60.6% were 
Serbs and 34.90% Croats. Glina itself had 6,933 inhabitants, of which 1,448 
were Croats. The site emphasises that these conditions have changed since 
‘The Homeland War.’ The last census records a population of 9,868, out of 
which 68.01% are Croats and 28.66% Serbs. A 2006 survey conducted by 
SDF on the employment of ethnic minorities in the public service sector 
shows that of 357 employees only four were Serbs (SDF 2006). 
 Local and (some) private television stations with national broadcast regu-
larly raise the atrocities committed against Croatian civilians in Glina. The 
OSCE notes that such broadcasts “contained elements of hate speech, viola-
tion of ethical codes and media bias” (OSCE 2006a: 1). 
 The town witnessed two major forced migration flows during the war. In 
1991, after Serbs took control, Croats were submitted to ethnic cleansing. 
The second flow occurred during Operation Storm. At this time, the vast 
majority of Serbs left to seek refuge in Bosnia and Serbia. When the first 
group of Serbian refugees attempted to return in 1996, a prominent local 
politician led a group of Croat citizens in stoning their bus. He later sent an 
official note to the government that Serbs are not welcome in Glina (HHO 
2001: 289). 
 Whereas in towns such as Vukovar (Kardov 2002) war produced an envi-
ronment of spatial division between Serbs and Croats, no such situation ex-
ists in Glina today. There is no separation of local cafés, stores or markets 
along ethnic lines. Furthermore, over the last several years no serious inter-
ethnic incidents have been recorded, even though many nationalist parties 
try to exploit the ‘Homeland War’ and ‘Serbian threat’ in the months before 
elections. 
 
3.2. Decision to leave; experience of exile; and decision to return 
 In order to understand the prospects of return and reintegration for the 
Serbian refugees, one must first assess the experiences of flight and exile. 
During the war, Serbian elites presented Serbia as a parent body of all Serbs 
and after the war were given a chance to show their solidarity. For many 
refugees, however, the reality of exile revealed that common ethnicity was 
not sufficient to secure acceptance by Serbs in Serbia. 
 When talking about their feelings during the flight, Serbian returnees of-
ten used terms like dehumanization, deprivation, insecurity, desperation, 
fear, and being cheated to describe the emotions that accompanied their de-
parture. Yet upon reaching their final destination, most were unable to se-
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cure more human conditions. The Serbian Government perpetuated their ag-
ony by first holding them on the borders and later directing them to Kosovo. 
Most of the interviewed returnees reflect with despair on these events, and 
emphasize that often such actions were followed by attempts of military and 
paramilitary officials to forcibly recruit the male population and send them 
to the front-lines. Interviewed returnees perceived such treatments as shifting 
from one life-threatening condition to another.  
 During exile they experienced numerous problems, including economic 
hardship, a lack of employment, uncertainty of the future, and the denial of 
citizenship. As well, local Serbs were often hostile to the new transplants. 
Most were welcomed with hostility, let alone accepted as friends. Although 
individual exceptions were named, the general impression from all inter-
viewed returnees was that they were perceived by local populations as 
primitives, people of lower value, traitors and a threat to the local commu-
nity’s economy.  
 Shared ethnicity was not a basis for cooperation or solidarity between 
refugees and locals. Local Serbs perceived refugees according to their terri-
torial and cultural “roots.” In such conditions, the desire to return to Glina 
was even stronger. Many interviewees expressed that they made their deci-
sion to return during their first days of exile. The quality of life they had in 
Glina before the war was also particularly important in their desire to return.  
 
3.3. Reality of return; first encounter with home and old neighbours 
 For those Serbs who longed for their former life in Croatia, return meant 
entering a new hostile environment. The impression of the vast majority of 
respondents was that Croats perceived them as enemies and held them re-
sponsible for everything negative that had happened during the war. This re-
sulted in discrimination in various social settings and various types of 
abuses, ranging from personal insults to physical attacks. One of the inter-
viewees’ house was bombed on three occasions after his return. 
 A significant numbers of Serbian returnees emphasized that verbal at-
tacks were part of their everyday life. When entering a store, one might hear, 
“Go back to Serbia, Chetniks!” or “Now you are returning, and when you 
were killing us and burning our houses, where were you then?” This resulted 
in fear and avoidance of public places. 
 Meeting old Croat neighbours was another source of disappointment. Al-
though individual exceptions were mentioned (as they say: “who was normal 
before, stayed normal after the war as well”), the vast majority of respon-
dents stated that their pre-war friends refused to help or talk to them during 
the worse cases of physical threat, for example. In such an environment, so-
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cial cooperation between Croats and Serbs was very limited, if present at all. 
Many interviewees noted, however, that they knew that many of their old 
friends wanted to re-establish a relationship but were afraid of the reaction of 
‘the others.’ The interviewees believed that for Croats, socializing with 
Serbs may result in social exclusion.  
 Yet for several returnees, these conditions resulted in a higher awareness 
of their role in society and their responsibility towards other Serbs still in 
exile, who might want to return. As the Serbian returnee whose house was 
bombed on several occasions said,  
“I knew that I was the first one who returned, and I knew what was 
the attempt of the attacker … if I take my things and flee back to Ser-
bia, I knew that not a single Serb would return” (Interview 4 2006). 
 Serbian returnees developed different coping strategies. Some of them 
established a mode of action whereby they were prepared for the insults and 
learned not to react, but wait for emotions to settle before re-establishing so-
cial relations. Others stated that these events taught them they should never 
trust or be friends with people who received them with so much anger, hate 
and animosity. 
 
3.4. Reality of return: social networks and everyday life today 
 There is a significant variation between the responses of the perceived 
situation in Glina today. They range from feelings of perpetual exclusion 
from society, to proud statements of survival given their ability to re-estab-
lish their place in the community.  
 Regarding personal safety, all respondents said that they no longer feel 
physically threatened. According to a significant number of returnees, coop-
eration on a day-to-day basis has begun. The ways in which cooperation, 
solidarity, and closer societal link develop is perceived differently by various 
individuals.  
 Younger Serbian returnees stated that they do not pay attention to the 
ethnicity of others. One returnee mentioned that in 2000, as there were no 
places for young people to socialize in Glina, they organized parties at one 
private house, and the young people, regardless of their ethnicity or taste in 
music, have participated in these. Politics was never a topic of their conver-
sation, and it would never happen that Serbs would decide not to come be-
cause of the presence of Croats or vice versa. A young Serbian couple ex-
pressed that they do not see their friends as often as they used to, but it is not 
an ethnic problem, as much as it is a lack of time. The younger generation 
seems to be more concerned with issues of economic insecurity and the poor 
material conditions found in Glina rather than ethnicity. 
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 After surviving the first years of reintegration, the returnee whose house 
was bombed, took out construction loans, invested in cattle, and stabled a 
successful farm. As a farmer he emphasizes the need to cooperate closely 
with Croats, which led to the re-establishment of some old friendships. In 
fact, sharing everyday experiences, especially at work, has been a common 
way to overcome the divisions of ethnicity. The former teacher comfortably 
stated that those who are causing problems are those who do not know or 
like to work. 
 On the contrary, there are a significant number of returnees who still 
have not managed to re-establish trust with Croats. In response to one ques-
tion about problems with Croatian neighbours, one Serbian returnee stated:  
“I don’t have any problems with them … the only thing is that this 
social contact has not been established…I don’t argue with him, nor 
fight … we just ignore each other … I tried to greet him once, he re-
fused … So I don’t even try any more … why should I force some-
thing which is not meant to happen” (Interview 7 2006). 
 Often the problem is not because of the Croats’ unwillingness to cooper-
ate with the Serbians. One Serbian woman stated that she will never be able 
to trust again the people who turned their back on her when she needed them 
the most.   
 It is interesting to note that for those Serbian returnees who still feel a 
sense of social exclusion, and who have not managed to re-establish their 
modes of cooperation with Croats, life in Glina is seen as one divided along 
ethnic lines. For them, social cooperation is an exception, rather than the 
rule. Further, they still feel that there is pressure from other Croats on those 
who do socialize with Serbs. The result is that even though some Croats visit 
Serbs, they may ignore or act ignorantly towards Serbs in public places.  
 The Croatian responses on the presence of Serbian returnees varied as 
well. There are those who, despite having experienced great family loses, do 
not hesitate to cooperate with Serbs. Others recognise that the region’s eco-
nomic underdevelopment is a problem common to both Serbs and Croats 
and cooperation is inevitable. Nevertheless, there are those who think that it 
is not appropriate to establish close relations with Serbs:  
“With those who openly participated in rebellion, trust cannot ever be 
established again … I can see them on the street and ignore them, but 
friends with them I can never be again. I teach my children not to 
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3.5. Perception of public institution, town symbols and media 
representation of the Serbs and events in 1990s 
 Most returnees shared similar stories about the treatment they receive 
from public institutions, the media and town symbols. One response typifies 
these sentiments: “Serbs have all rights and no rights at all.” Others ex-
pressed that they were “second rate citizens,”, and that there is no place for 
Serbs in this Croatian state. They were particularly concerned with the fol-
lowing issues: employment, access to public services, the politicisation of 
town symbols, and their mostly negative portrayal in the media. 
 Serbian returnees perceive that there are no employment opportunities 
for them in public institutions. A returnee who held a high position in 
Glina’s public sector during the occupation provided a personal example; he 
was rejected for a position in the public sphere for not passing ‘the security 
criteria’. Although there were no other candidates he could not get a single 
vote from the hiring commission. 
 Almost all of the interviewed Serbian returnees stated that they hesitate 
to apply for other jobs; they don’t want to embarrass themselves by being re-
fused again. These concerns often centred on state policies and practices re-
garding reintegration. The impressions of a significant numbers of returnees 
is that all the deadlines for tenancy rights, reconstruction, pensions and 
property return were impossible to meet. Returnees were either never pro-
vided with the full information, or documents and information would arrive 
only after deadlines expired.   
 Access to services such as water, electricity, sewage and main roads were 
another question of concern, and source of resignation and frustration. Many 
Serb-majority villages around Glina do not have access to these services.The 
town mayor’s only response, however, is that there is no funding for such 
services.  
 Another source of irritation is Glina’s decision to remove the town 
monument dedicated to the victims of the WWII ‘ustasha’ regime replace it 
with a cultural home honouring Croatian customs and traditions. Those in-
terviewed believe that such occasions are clear signs of disrespect toward the 
Serbian victims of WWII and an attempt to belittle the fact that Serbs have 
lived in Glina for several centuries. 
 Returnees often cited harsh treatment from local radio and private TV 
stations with national broadcast. Many accused these media outlets of por-
traying events in the 1990s and in Glina in a way that imposed a collective 
responsibility on all Serbs who stayed during the occupation. Serbian return-
ees do acknowledge that Serbian troops committed horrible atrocities against 
Croatian civilians during the occupation; however they state that the media 
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never reports stories about Serbs who helped Croats to survive, or escape 
from paramilitary militias. 
 Both Serb and Croat interviewees emphasized the Serbian delegation’s 
visit to the Josevica memorial site where a large number of Croatian civil-
ians were massacred by a Serbian paramilitary militia. This event was rec-
ognised as a further step towards reconciliation and normalisation of condi-
tions in Glina. Nevertheless, Serbian returnees would like to receive the 
same acknowledgement from Croats for their losses after Operation Storm. 
 
4. Analysis 
 What seems to be apparent from the findings is that, although Serbian re-
turnees encounter similar issues associated with particular social settings, the 
variety of responses challenges the existence of a single, common Serbian 
returnee experience. The academics in the field of forced migration have of-
ten called for an approach to refugee research that applies a “general and 
comparative perspective which sees certain consistencies and patterns in the 
refugee experience” (Stein 1981: 330). Yet the findings above seem to sug-
gest that instead of searching for a unique and robust ‘refugee experience’, 
we must adopt a more cautious approach to analyzing the reintegration ex-
periences of Glina.  
 According to the narratives detailed above, even in cases where returnees 
share attributes of several category memberships (common ethnicity, terri-
tory of origin, and levels of education or similar occupations) we recognize 
varying experiences. To assume that the Serbian returnees have a single re-
turnee experience is to assume that there is a strong feeling of ‘groupness’ 
(Brubaker 2006: 13) across the ethnic category, the basic denominator of 
how a refugee experiences his or her return and reintegration into society. 
This replaces the agency of the individual with the agency of the group 
(Brubaker 2006: 8); thus, we implicitly see refugees as a “homogenous mass 
of needy and passive victims” (Turton 2003: 7). Instead of searching for 
common experiences, we should instead analyse the settings. How and 
across which categories do the similarities of experiences appear? Is the 
feeling of exclusion in one setting going to have a spill-over effect on re-
turnees’ actions and feelings in other areas of everyday life? What are the 
challenges for re-establishing old and creating new modes of cooperation?  
 
4.1. Public Settings and the hidden label 
 Serbian returnees seem to develop a high feeling of membership to one 
particular group when discussing the following circumstances: the treatment 
of state institution and access to public services, media presentation, and the 
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politicisation of town symbols. These were the areas which trigger one’s no-
tion of ethnicity and thus lead a returnee to conceive the world to be con-
structed in ethnic terms. In Brubaker’s words, these settings are producing a 
high level of ‘groupness’ (2004: 11, 2005: 13, 2006: 9); “ethnicity is invoked 
to account for action or stance” (2006: 362). Consequently, we can see re-
turnees developing the sense of ‘we’ (the Serbs) as a reaction to being de-
nied a particular set of rights and services, comparing to ‘them’ (the Croats).  
 Also significant are the circumstances in which ethnicity has been (indi-
rectly) institutionalized over the last decade. If we compare this research 
with Zetter’s work on the power of bureaucratic labels (Zetter 1991), we can 
suggest that the modified term, ‘the hidden label,’ can appropriately describe 
the position of Serbian returnees in relation to state institutions. While in 
Zetter’s study the delivery of services and attribution of rights was con-
nected to labels designed for the purposes of bureaucratic practices (1991: 
40), the position of Serbian returnees develops from the inability to access 
these services, and bureaucratic practice which, over the last decade, has dis-
couraged their return and reintegration.  
 The outcome of these policies was that Serbian returnees accepted the 
role for which these setting were designed in the first place. Today most 
Serbian returnees do not even consider applying for positions in public in-
stitutions, and consider only with great scepticism the possibilities of gaining 
access to already denied public services. This is evident in statements such 
as: “I will never apply again for the position as there is no way that a Serbian 
can get it.”  
 It is important to recognize, however, that Serbian returnees are not only 
concerned with their individual inability to secure employment, but also with 
the wider impact that these structures have on social networks from which 
they could benefit. As several returnees stated: “there is no ‘our’ people 
working in public institutions.” The concern is therefore related to an inabil-
ity to count on informal support or help which would be possible if more 
Serbs worked in these institutions. 
 Media and politicisation of town symbols were the other two settings in 
which ‘groupness’ along ethnic lines occurs. The outcomes of perceived 
‘groupness,’ however, varied between these settings. Hate speech and accu-
sations of war crimes against local Serbs produced feelings of insecurity: 
‘“you never know when the next Serb can become a target of such an accu-
sation.” On the other hand, the politicisation of town symbols, such as the 
replacement of the WWII Memorial with the “Croatian Home,” results in 
feelings of disappointment. Serbs perceive their historical contributions to be 
neglected. This results in a shared feeling of exclusion, and perception that 
the state is foreign to them.  
 
Politička misao, Vol. XLV, (2008.), No. 5, pp. 191–217 209 
                                                                                                                            
 In all these cases, it seems that belonging to the Serbian ethnic group is 
perceived by returnees as a primary label imposed on them in communica-
tion with authorities. Many consider their freedom of agency to represent 
themselves across other categories as very limited within the context of for-
mal institutions. The examples, like the well-educated man who applied for a 
high position in the local municipality and was later rejected due to his Ser-
bian ethnicity, (even though there were no other applicants for the job), re-
main strongly embedded in the shared memories of the Serbian returnees. 
Over the long term, such stories further contain Serbian returnees in the lens 
of group membership. Within such context, the prevailing returnee percep-
tion is that “this is Croatian state in which there is no place for Serbs.” This 
further expresses returnee’s disappointment with their limited possibilities of 
agency in public settings. Hence, their perception is that regardless of their 
deeds, the media and public authorities will always judge them according to 
ethnicity, thus they cannot count on any support. This results with strong 
feeling of alienation which goes hand in hand with a strong feeling of 
‘groupness’ across their ethnic category.  
 This raises a further challenge for our analysis. Can we expect that emo-
tions and identities associated to institutionalised settings of everyday life 
will influence how one constructs the image of his or her role, and the po-
tential actions of others? The narratives of Serbian returnees provide several 
competing interpretations of reintegration when the discussion moves from 
public to private settings. On the one hand, some returnees feel that exclu-
sion on the grounds of ethnicity is highly present. Others emphasise full in-
ter-ethnic cooperation and perceive their private relations in non-ethnic 
terms. 
 
4.2. Spatial Category and Economic Development as Promises for 
Cooperation 
 Once basic physical security is established, returnees find themselves 
able to re-establish the role they enjoyed prior to exile and develop varying 
coping strategies to adjust to the new challenges of the post-conflict envi-
ronment. Time, accompanied by the overall economic and material condi-
tions of Glina, allowed the interpretation of everyday realities to shift be-
yond ethnic terms.  
 Glina’s underdevelopment paradoxically seemed to have a mediating 
role in relaxing tensions between Croats and Serbs, and transforming the 
level of groupness across ethnic lines. Both Serbs and Croats mentioned that 
economic ‘hardship’ is a problem shared by every citizen of Glina, regard-
less of ethnicity. In these conditions, several Croats stated that Serbs no 
longer present a threat in Glina. These problems were stated in non-ethnic 
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terms, and instead focused on the lack of state investments and high levels of 
corruption in the local municipality. As a result, this increased cooperation 
between Croats and Serbs often evolved into the restoration of old friend-
ships and bonds. Consequently ethnic categories have been replaced with 
other categories that develop feelings of belonging. As emphasized by one 
interviewee, the shared experience of hard work brings people together. For 
this individual, most everyday situations are now constructed in non-ethnic 
terms; individuals prone to nationalist feelings provocations are an exception 
and he simply ignores them. Those whom he socializes with (regardless of 
their ethnicity) react in the same manner. These acquaintances are, in his 
words, “those who work don’t have time to be bored with such stupid things 
as nationalism.” Such a statement reveals that in these setting, returnees per-
ceive the freedom to act according to their will, and are responsible for the 
outcomes of their actions, regardless of ethnic membership, which in turn 
opens venues for other lines of identification. 
 For younger Serbian returnees, ethnicity does not represent an obstacle 
for cooperation with Croats. Rather, again, the underdevelopment of Glina 
and the lack of entertainment produce additional settings for cooperative ac-
tions, such as the organisation of private parties. Ethnicity thus becomes a 
less relevant category, and does not perpetuate a feeling of exclusion from 
society. Most talk about the general economic hardship in the Glina area as 
the key obstacle to normal life. In such conversations it became clear that 
age and common generational problems worry the younger interviewees, 
rather than those marked by ethnic colour.  
 These examples challenge the often obvious reconciliation-reintegration 
nexus. Chimni (2002) argues that for return to be sustainable, reconciliation 
must precede the reintegration (2002:168). He views reconciliation as the 
‘consolidation of social relations between different groups of the popula-
tion’, and reintegration as “a process which enables formerly displaced peo-
ple…to enjoy a progressively greater degree of physical, social, legal and 
material security” (2002:168). According to the limited data of this research, 
it is possible to assume that for a significant number of Serbian returnees in 
Glina things developed the other way around. The consolidation of social 
relations slowly evolved once the physical threat had been removed.  
 Following these trends, many Serbian returnees emphasise territoriality 
and the traditional culture of cooperation in Glina as a basic category across 
which they form their identity. Further, this enables them to find new paths 
for successful cooperation with their fellow townsmen. It can be assumed 
according to the data that territoriality was also important for the Serbian 
returnees during exile, which in their case had a more salient position in 
comparison to ethnicity. 
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 While in exile, the local Serbs did not express much ethnic solidarity to-
ward the refugees. Instead, local Serbs were more concerned with the territo-
riality and cultural stereotypes associated with it. Valcic’s (2005) study of 
the spatial reconfiguration of belonging in Serbia raises some interesting 
points from which some comparison with the returnees in Glina can be 
made. She analyses the development of an emerging urban identity among 
young Belgrade elites, citing that “it is an instrumental move of positive self 
presentation that is based on a false dichotomy between urban, cosmopolitan 
vs. rural Serbia” (2005:641). Part of this urban identity was the adoption of 
“deterministic city rhetoric in arguing against rural nationalism” (2005: 646), 
accompanied by widespread animosity against the Serbs from Krajina (2005: 
651). 
 Her study also suggests that lays in similarities develop between the Bel-
grade elites and Serbian returnees in terms of spatial belonging. When re-
flecting on war crime atrocities, many Belgradians emphasise their urban 
identity and express a reluctance to bear any responsibility for the atrocities 
committed by Serbs or Croats (2005: 653). The similarity between the utility 
of these two spatial identities is interesting. In Glina’s case, the role of urban 
identity is replaced with the WWII partisan tradition, while in both cases it is 
used to retreat from the individual responsibilities of war crimes. Never-
theless, it can be assumed that in Glina’s case this means more than avoiding 
any responsibility for the events of the 1990s. By connecting the horrors of 
war to exogenous forces and emphasizing the culture of solidarity that for-
merly existed in Glina, residents aim to restore the trust destroyed by the war.  
 Regarding the cooperation and positive reintegration outcomes that a 
number of Serbian returnees perceive to be occurring in non-formal setting, 
one additional concluding remark can be made. These settings, excluding 
public institutions and the media, allow returnees a higher freedom of 
agency; they can act according to the designations they decide for them-
selves. In such circumstances, they will avoid identifying themselves pri-
marily according to their ethnicity, and instead stress those other categories 
which can help them integrate and feel a part of the community. Thus, a 
greater perceived freedom of agency, combined with shared memories of 
exile and the particular social and economic conditions in Glina, seem to 
have contributed to the possibility for some returnees to construct their eve-
ryday lives in non-ethnic terms.  
 
4.3. Coexistence without Cooperation 
 Yet this paper does not intend to minimize the experiences of those Serbs 
who continue to perceive ethnic tensions, where membership in an ethnic 
category represents the key denominator for micro-level social actions in 
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Glina. We can neither neglect the responses of those Croats who have spo-
ken openly against cooperating with Serbs, or those who expressed that, al-
though they do not object to cooperation with Serbs, there remains pressure 
from other to continue to exclude Serbs. Moreover, given the still existing 
levels of distrust and animosity in social settings, it is interesting to see what 
meanings are ascribed by those Serbian returnees that have little or no con-
tacts with Croats. What are the causes of their experiences? The aim here is 
not to provide an ultimate response, but to reflect on the variations of experi-
ences and the logics of the process of exclusion itself.  
 According to the data, the social exclusion experienced by many Serbian 
returnees has a dual nature. It is simultaneously the outcome and producer of 
ethnic tension. As the outcome, exclusion was the consequence of the highly 
hostile environment Serbian returnees faced on their initial return. These 
conditions have resulted with at least three versions of explanations of why 
the social networks and trust were not restored in the years after the return. 
 In the example of the woman neglected by her old friend, this negative 
experience has stayed vivid in her life even after many years. Her first en-
counter with pre-war fellow townsmen led her to construct the meaning of 
the community in which ethnicity remained the key category according to 
which she associates trust, and consequently makes future decisions. As Žu-
panov (1995) suggests, such experience leads victimised individuals to 
question whether the cooperation was ever genuine or if it was just a façade 
of deeper animosity (1995: 38-39). Consequently, she simply does not want 
to engage in any restoration of cooperation, even when the chance arises, 
thus she keeps contact to a minimum. 
 Cooperation may also be rejected as the opportunity materialises. First 
approaches to neighbours may have been met with ignorance, and many re-
turnees, instead of seeking re-establishment of cooperation, have assumed 
that cooperation will never be resumed. As one returnee mentioned, they 
continue their separate lives without forcing something that is not meant to 
happen. Such individuals perceive Glina to be divided in to two separate 
worlds, the members of each accepting the rules of his and the other’s world 
as normal. Neighbours continue living nearby, but without any contact. 
 Finally there are the responses of those who share barely any contact 
with their pre-war neighbours, but would like to do so. Among these indi-
viduals are those who held prominent public positions in Glina before and 
during the war, but have lost those positions and cannot re-establish them 
due to aforementioned conditions of indirect discrimination. For such indi-
viduals, exclusion resulting from hidden labels is in accordance with per-
sonal experiences in other settings, thus creating the perception of Glina as 
not just a divided town, but also one in which silent conflict between ethnic 
groups is present.  
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 For the returnees who expressed these experiences, ethnicity remains an 
interpretative frame for perceiving social relationships in Glina. Nationalist 
messages, thought marginal compared to other towns, are conceived by these 
returnees as a source of irritation and possible threat. Whether these condi-
tions can be changed, and how the different variables over time will affect 
the nature of such relations remains an open question. The data presented, 
however, highlights the complexity and challenges of reintegration experi-
ences of Serbian returnees today.  
 
Conclusion 
 The main objective of this paper is to represent the realities of reintegra-
tion for Serbian returnees in the town of Glina, Croatia. This paper argues 
that this returnee group deserves particular attention as they represent a mi-
nority population in a newly formed state whose formation was marked by 
inter-ethnic war. Nationalist politics in Croatia continued long after the 
fighting ended, purposefully impeding the return of thousands of Serbian 
returnees. These policies and events posed two main obstacles for the reinte-
gration of Serbian returnees: hostility of their fellow townsmen and dis-
crimination from public institutions. Yet given these complex conditions, 
both in the private and public sphere, the returnees do not react with one 
unique experience of reintegration.  
 Reintegration after return can only be understood by the analysis of 
different social milieus in which individuals interact. While one might per-
ceive themselves as excluded in one setting, they can feel fully integrated in 
another. The analysis of data collected made use of Brubaker’s analytical 
devices. Focusing on the work of various categories used in constructing so-
cial realities helped explore how and under what conditions a returnee de-
velops their understandings of various social settings and how he constructs 
his role in each of these. The narratives analysed suggest that whether indi-
viduals feel integrated or not depends on their perception of freedom of 
agency; the ability not only to make choices but act, effectively, upon them. 
 The research undertaken suggests that discriminatory practices during the 
1990s did indeed result in perceptions of a state distant from the needs of its 
Serbian returnees. This hidden label raises several concerns for returnees and 
certainly guides their expectations and actions in regard to public institu-
tions. This exclusion, however, did not inevitably translate into alienation 
from other settings of the return environment. Other settings have their own 
dynamics, and with time, different issues will allow fellow townspersons to 
cooperate together. On the other hand, a number of Serbian returnees inter-
viewed still had little or no contact with Croats. The answer to the important 
question of why these conditions allowed for the integration for some, and 
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segregation for others is difficult to answer, considering the limitations of 
this research. Yet some preliminary conclusions can be proposed, and as al-
ways, further research is invited.  
 Economic conditions in Glina seemed to have relaxed tensions and dis-
trust felt by some returnees. In responding to shared economic conditions, a 
growing number of Glina residents began to perceive the main threats in 
Glina in non-ethnic terms. Nevertheless, for those Serbian returnees still 
without contact with Croats, Glina remains deeply divided along ethnic 
lines. Why the immediate climate of hostility during return continues to 
structure the experience and cognition of only some returnees in such an 
acute fashion remains a difficult question, perhaps one for the future studies.  
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